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INTERNATIONAL DISISION OF LABOUR 
Umezu Kazuro 
PREFACE 
Orthodox economists have not dealt with the theoretical problemns of international trade 
under monopolistic conditions. 
For example Professor G. Haberler has referred to the probleme of monopoly as a part 
of trade policy, not as an integral part of trade theory (C. Haberler, The theory of Inter· 
national Trade, English edition, Part II Trade Policy, Chapter XVIII, Dumping, Cartels, 
Monopolies and Export Bounties). 
Another example is found in "International Economics" by Professor R. Harrod. He cn-
ticizes the classical writers as follows : 
"Classical writers on economics were 111 the habit, when discussing monopoly, of dismi-
ssing it as an exceptional phenomenon. This attitude is out of date for two reasons, 
first because of the great growth since their day of monopolistic combinations of various 
kinds, whether mergers, trusts, cartels or gentlemens, agreements, and secondly because 
the theoretic analysis of monopoly and competition has revealed that both monopoly and 
competition are limiting concepts, abstractions, relating to conditions not always realized 
in practice, and that most industries work in conditions which are and admixture of those 
represented by the two concepts. Thus a large sphere which the classical writers thought 
of as competitive is in fact only so in a partial sense" (R. Harrod, op. cit., 1959, p. 49). 
In spite of this criticism, Professor Harrod has not developed the theoretical problems of 
international trade under monopolistic conditions. He has only referred to them as the case 
of the failure of adjustment to comparative real costs. 
In short the theoretical problems of international trade under monopolistic conditions have 
not been studied sufficiently. 
In this essay we have tried to develop these problems in the light of recent advance of 
studies on monopoly. We expect frank and severe criticisms from the readers, and hope 
to work out the whole analysis anew in the future. 
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1-INTRODUCTION 
1) Historical Realities 
In his last book, "Patterns of Trade and Development" (1959), the late Professor R. 
Nurkse referred to the current lag in exports of non-industrial countries. 
According to his tableau economique of world trade (at the time of 1957) the exports 
of industrial countries to each other occupy 43% of the world trade. The share of the 
exports of industrial to non-industrial countries is 2696, while that of the exports of non-
industrial to industrial countries is 22%. Lastly the exports of non-industrial countries to 
each other occupy only 9%. 
Next he showed us the indices of export volume from industrial countries and non-
industrial countries (base year= 1928). In 1955 exports of industrial countries attained the 
level of 139, while the exports (excluding petroleum) from non-industrial countries only 
118.5 (see Table 2). 
Thirdly let us examine the percentage share of non- industrial countries m the value of 
world trade on Table 3. Exports from non-industrial countries excluding oil decreased from 
32.2% in 1928 to 24.4% in 1957. 
From these observations follow the two problems. The first is the problem why the per-
centage share of exports from industrial countries to each other in world trade increased 
so rapidly. The second problem is related to the decreasing share of non-industrial countries 
in the value of world trade. Here we want to deal with these two problems from the 
theoretical point of view. 
TABLE 1- TABLEAU ECONOMIQUE OF WORLD TRADE AT THE PRESENT 
TIME (1957) 
Exports of: 
Industrial countries to each other (AA) 
Industrial countries to non-industrial countries (AB) 
Non-industrial to industrial countries (BA) 
Non-industrial countries to each other (BB) 











Source : R. Nurkse, op. cit., p. 203. 
TABLE 2 INDICES OF EXPORTS VOLUME (1928 = 100) 
1955 1957 
Exports from industrial countries (a) 139 162 
Exports from non-industrial countries (b) 138 151 
of which: 1) petroleum 479 
2) all other primary products 118.5 
a) OEEC Europe, United States, Canada and Japan. 
b) All other countries outside the Soviet Area. 
Source: Trands in International Trade, Gatt, Geneva, 1958 from R. Nurkse, op. cit., p. 291. 
TABLE 3- PERCENTAGE SHARE OF NON-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES IN THE 
VALUE OF WORLD TRADE (a) 
Including oil Excluding oil 
exporting countries exporting countries 
9b Q/ ,o 
1928 1957 1928 1957 
Exports 33.8 31.3 32.2 24.4 
Imports 28.0 35.0 26.9 30.4 
(a) Excluding all Soviet - Area imports and exports. 
The figures for imports as well as exports are based on f. o. b. values. 
Source: Trends in International Trade, from R. Nurkse, op. cti. p. 292. 
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2) The Position of Adam Smith in the Theory of International Division of 
Labour. 
Before dealing directly with these problems, first of all we must examine the classical 
theory of internatioal division of labour in the light of modern experience in world trade. 
Let us begin with a rather neglected notion, that is to say, the idea of Adam Smith in 
this field of study. He criticized the mercantilist idea that the principal benefit of foreign 
trade was the importation of gold and silver, and he made it clear that it consists in the 
carrying out of surplus produce for which there is no demand and bringing back something 
which there is. 
The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole benefit which 
a nation derives from its foreign trade. 
All the countries in which foreign trade is carried on, derive two distinct benefits from 
it. Foreign trade carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for 
which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for 
which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for 
something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. 
By means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour 
in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection. 
By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may 
exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to 
augment its annual produce to the utmost, and there by to increase the real revenue and 
wealth of Society:'' (A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the wealth of 
Nations, Cannans edition, 1961, vol. 2, pp. 468-9). 
He defines the role of foreign market as "vent for surplus," which extends the division 
of labour in home market. 
According to him the scale of the market depends on the degree of division of labour. 
If a market is large, the division of labour is large to that extent. The existence of foreign 
market facilitates and encourages the development of the division of labour in home market, 
and thus augments the annual prod•1cts of labour. In this sense his notion of "vent for 
surplus" is very dynamic. But on the other hand it lacks the exactnes of logic. He did 
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not explain the competitive conditions of international trade among countries. 
3) The Examination of the Doctrine of Comparative Costs. 
No theory can be so clear and rigorous as that of D. Ricardo, belonging to the English 
Classical School. He explained the logic of international division of labour with clarity 
and exactness. 
"England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may require the labour of 
100 men for one year; and if she attempted to make the wine, it might require the labour 
of 120 men for the same itme. England would therefore find it her interest to improve 
wine, and to purchase it by the exportation of cloth. 
To produce the wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of 80 men for one year, 
and to pro:luc::! the cloth in the same country, might require the labour of 90 men for the 
same time. It would therefore be advantageous for her to export wine in exchange for 
cloth. 
This exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the commodity imported by 
Portugal could be produced there with less labour than in England. 
Though she could make the cloth with the labour of 90 men, she would import it from 
a country where it required the labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be ad· 
vantageous to her rather to employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she 
would obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of 
her capital from the cultivation of wines to the manufacture of cloth" (The works and 
correspondence of David Ricardo, ed. by Sraffa, vol. 1. p. 135). 
According to Professor G. Haberler, in accordance with the relative costs, an exchange 
rate will be established in England of 1 unit of wine against 1. 2 units of cloth, and in 
Portugal 9 units of wine against 8 units of cloth, that is to say 1 unit of wine against 
0. 88 units of cloth. Suppose now that trade takes place. It is clearly advantageous to 
Portugal to send wine to England, where a unit of it commands 1. 2 units of cloth. Portugal 
will take to producing wine in stead of cloth. England, on the other hand, can obtain 
wine at much less expense by specialising upon the manufacture of cloth and exchanging 
the cloth with Portugal against wine. For Portugal there 1s a sufficient inducement to 
engage in international trade of 1 unit of wine commands a little more than 0. 88 units of 
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cloth; for England, if a little less than 1.2 of cloth must be given for 1 wine. Hence any 
exchange ratio between 0,88 and 1.2 cloth against 1 wine represents a gain to both coun-
tries (C. Haberber, op. cit. p. 129). 
This version of Ricardo's theory of comparative costs by Professor Haberler is inherited 
by many orthodox economists, such as Professor Harrod. 
As the above-mentioned phrase shows us, Ricardo introduced the international comparison 
of costs in order to explain trade phenomena. His theory of comparative costs is rigorous 
in logic, but is a static one, which cannot clarify the development process of international 
trade. So we must take into consideration the dynamic character of A. Smiths theory, and 
correct the defects of D. Ricardo's theory. 
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2- INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN 
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 
1) Preparatory works. 
In all industrial countries market forms other than competition, that is to say, oligopoly, 
have become more and more dominant. So we had better begin with this market form, 
and consider the case of international division of labour under oilgopoly. 
Let us suppose that the unit cost of automobiles and that of chemical goods is the same, 
for example, 20 in both countries, say Unites States of America and Germany. 
SCHEMA 1 
Automobile unit cost Chemical goods unit cost 
U.S. A. 20 20 
Germany 20 20 
In this example, as a matter of fact, trade between the two countries does not take place. 
Suppose now that in Germany oligopolistic competitions prevail and the structure of in-
dustry in Germany is as follows : 
Number and Output of 
size of firms each firm 
20 small 100 
2 medium 1,000 
1 large 8,000 







And let initial price be 20 and the elasticity of demand equal to unity. 
We have borrowed this example from Professor Sylos- Labini's book "Oligopoly and 
Technical Progress" English edition 1962, (pp. 40-50), and later we shall modify it partially. 
Let us consider the rate of profit over cost: 
px - k - vx 
r = 
k + vx 
. . . . .. . . . .. . ( 1) 
where px is total revenue, k total fixed cost, and vx total variable cost, all expressed m 
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annual terms (Sylos-Labini, op. cit., p. 40). 
Next Professor Sylos-Labini has introduced a new concept that is to say, the m1mmum 
profit rate, which establishes an important and well- defined limit to profit maximization, 
whether in the short or in the long run. 
"To illustrate this point, let us suppose that a firm acquires all its factors of production 
with borrowed funds on which it pays 5 percent interest. The firm subsequently has an 
opportunity either to invest a further 100, which would yield a profit of 6, or a further 200, 
yielding a profit of 8. The absolute amount of profit is higher in the second case, but 
the profit rate of 4 percent compares with 6 percent in the first case. The current rate 
of interest being 5 percent, the enterpreneur can effect only such investments as yield him 
at least 5 percent and he will therefore not invest 200". (Sylos ·La bini, op. cit., p. 42). 
If this minimum profit rate is rm and we know the fixed cost, variable cost, and output 
of a given firm, the price corresponding to the minimum profit rate for that firm is: 
pm x = rm k + rm vx + K, 
or 
pm = ( 
k 
z 
+ v) (1 + rm) (2) 
If the price leaders (monopoly firms) intend to prevent the entry of new firms of a given 
type, they must keep the price below the level which would give the new firms their 
minimum profit rate: the "entry- preventing price" pc is lower than pm. 
Suppose that minimum profit rate, rm, is 5 percent, total fixed cost is 24,000, the average 
variable cost is 14 and total output is 8,000. Then we obtain the price, pm, corresponding 
to the minimum profit rate of 5 percent. 
pm ( 
24000 ) 
8,000 + 14 (1 + 0,05) 17.8 
But what is more important here is the entry-preventing price, pc. According to Pro-
fessor Sylos- Labini, this entry- preventing or elimination price lies immediately below the 
average variable cost. 
"If the price leaders intend to squeeze out existing firms, they must fix the price at a 
level below the variable cost of the firms they want to eliminate : a firm can survive for 
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some time if the price 1s so low that the fixed cost cannot be recouped, but it can remain 
in the market for only a relatively short period if the price falls below variable cost, requi-
ring disbursements at short intervals. The "elimination price" is lower than the variable 
cost of the firms to be eliminated (pc (v). Strictly speaking, this is the short-run elimina-
tion price. In the long run, any price lower than pm for given type of firm will cause the 
firm gradually to abandon the market. In other words, the long- run elimination price 
coincides with the entry- preventing price" (Sylos - La bini, op. cit., p. 40). 
2) International Division of Labour under Oligopoly 
Our preparatory work being over, let us apply this structure of industry to German aut-
mobile industry. The three types of technology and hence three types of firms, in ascend-
ing order of intensity of fixed capital are shown in the table below. 
Costs and Profits of German automobile industry 





Total I Profit I Profit cost Price I Total Average 
l 
vatiable cost cos4 
I 
rev. I total per I rate % 
k k/x T=k+vx X [ G=px unit s=G/T X v px g 
I 
I 
I ! I 
100 I 100 1 17.5 1,850 20 2,ooo I 150 I 1.5 I 8.1 
I ! i 





8,000 27,000 3 
! 
14 136,000 ! 20 1160,000 3 
I 
17.6 
! ! I I 
Let us suppose that the large firm in German automobile industry wants to eliminate the 
small firms. The alimination price, pc, is 17. 4, because the average variable cost of the 
small firms is 17. 5. Then the large firm can obtain only the unit profit 0.4 (17.4-17= 
0. 4). In order to retain the initial total profit (24, 000), the large firm must increase its 
output to 60,000 (24,000 + 0.4). So the large firm must expand its output capacity by 
investment. After the expansion of its output capacity, the intensity of fixed capital in the 
large firm augment, and the variable cost diminishes. Let the total fixed cost of the large 
firm 240,000, and its variable cost 12. Then the unit profit of the large firm in German 
automobile industry will become 1. 4 (17. 4 --16) instead of the former 0. 4. Thus the large 
firm in German automobile industry can maximize its total profit, increasing its profit rate. 
In this sense we cannot agree with the notion of minimum profit rate introduced by Pro-
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fessor Sylos- La bini. 
Now after the elimination of the small firms, the large firm occupies their market share 
(2,000). The initial output of the large firm was 8,000, and so, on balance, the large 
firm must seek the vent of 50,000 units of cars (60,000- [2,000 + 8,000]. This situation 
gives rise to large scale of export drive from Germany. 
Now the initial schema can be changed as follows : 
SCHEMA 2 
Automobile unit cost 
U.S. A. 20 
Germany 17.4 
relative cost 
U.S. A. 1 
Germany 1.15 





Germany can export her automobile to the United States and imports chemical goods. 
Trade between the two countries can take place from more than 1 unit of chemical goods 
to less than 1. 15 units of automobiles. 
After the elimination of the small firms, the unit car price of the large firm in Germany 
tends to increase to 18. If the large firm in German automobile industry augment its 
unit price up to 20, it cannot compete with the medium- sized firms. At the price level 
of 18 in German automobile industry, medium- sized firms can gain nothing, and so they 
must cut the wage -level: In this case the large firm in German automobile industry cannot 
eliminate the medium- sized firms, for the average variable cost of the latter is 16, which 
is equal to the average cost of the large firm. 
After the elimination of the small firms the unit price of German automobile tends to 
increase up to 18. 
17.4 ---> 18 
Let us call this increase of price the setback process. 
Next let us examine the case of the chemical industry m Germany. In the chemical 
industry the intensity of fixed capital in the small firms is higher than the case of automo-
bile industry. So the average variable cost of the small firms is smaller than the case of 
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automobile industry. Therefore the oligopolistic competition is more intense than the case 
of automobile industry. 
Let the total fixed cost of the small firms 150 and its average cost 17. 3. Then we have 
the following table. 




I I p ft I Profit Output Fixed cost. I Average I Total Price I Total Total average variable I cost 
I 
p revenue T~t~l . per I rate (%) 
K I k/x I cost IT=k+vx I px G=px= unit g S=G/T I I I I 
100 150 1.5 17.3 1,880 20 2,000. 170 1.2 6.4 
1,000 2,000 2 16 18,000 20 20,000 2,000 2 11.1 
8,000 24,000 
i 
3 14 136,000 20 160,000 24,000 3 17.6 
I 
In this case the elimination price, pc, 1s 17.2 (17. 3 > 17. 2). So in order to retain 
the initial total profit, the large firm must expand its output up to 120,000 (24,000+0.2= 
120,000). This amount of output may be beyond the present capacity, which urges large 
firm to invest new capital. After its investment the intensity of fixed capital increases, 
and the average variable cost decreases. Let the new average fixed cost of the large firm 
be 5 instead of 3, and its average variable cost 10.5 instead of 14. 
Costs and Profits of The Large Film After New Investment in 












(a) before elimination 
(b) after elimination 
Average f Total 
variable I cost 
cost v T=k+vx 
Pice I' 
(a) 











Total 1 Per rot It I Profit I p f 
\G=px-TI u~it (%) 
784,000 1. 7 10.9 
618,000 0.4 2.4 
1,120,0001 4.5 29·0 
Since the new average cost of the large firm is 15.5 (5+10.5=15.5), it can also elimi-
nate the medium- sized firms after driving the small firms out of market. In order to 
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eliminate the medium- sized firms, the large firm has only to lower its price down to 15. 9, 
because the average variable cost of the medium- sized firms is 16. After the elimination 
of the two types of firms, the large firm can raise its price up to 20, which enables it to 
secure the maximum profit. With the initial price 20 new entry becomes possible, and 
again new price war begins between the large firm and new firms. 
Now let us remember that the initial market share of the small firms 1s 2,000. After 
the elimination of the small firms, the large firm must seek the vent of 110, 000 units of 
chemical goods (120, 000- (2, 000 + 8, 000)]. In the case of the second stage of elimination, 
that is to say, after ~he elimination of the med!um- sized firms, the large firm must export 
90,000 units of chemical goods (120,000-(2,000+8,000)]. In either case the amount of 
exports in chemical industry is larger than in automobile industry. In the case of chemical 
industry the oligopolistic competition is more intense. This means that the more violent 
the oligopolistic competition becomes, the more the large firm seek foreign market (110,000-
90,000 > 550,000). 
Now the schema 2 can be changed as follows : 
SCHEMA 3 
Automobile unit cost 
U.S. A. 20 
Germany 17.4 
relative cost 
U.S. A. 1 
Germany 1 





As a matter of fact, Germany exports chemical goods in exchange for automobiles. 
While the large firm in chemical industry is eliminating the two types of firms, the set-
back process is taking place in the automobile industry. Let the unit price of German 
automobiles be 18 instead of 17 .4. Then Schema 3 can be changed as as follows : 
SCHEMA 4 
u. s. A. 
Germany 














Schema 4 shows us that, after the setback process m German automobile industry is 
complete, the gains from trade increases from 1. 09 to 1. 12. This means that, after the 
monopoly price is established in German automobile industry, the gains from trade is larger 
than Schema 3 so long as the large firm in German chemical industry maintains its elimi-
nating price 15. 9. On the contrary the setback process is complete, and the large firm 
raises its price up to 20 (15. 9 --+ 20). Then the large firm, that is to say, the monopoly 
firm in German chemical industry can no longer export its goods. 








Chemical goods unit cost 
20 
20 
U. S. A. 1 1 
Germany 1.11 1 
After the setback process is complete, the monopoly firm m German chemical industry 
must lower its export price under 18 artificially. This situation gives rise to double- price 
system, export bounties and othen state subsidies. 
3) The Summary of this chapter. 
Now we want to summarize our arguments m this chapter as follows. 
1.- The more oligopolistic competition preYails in industries, the more the large firms 
seek foreign markets. This explains why exports of industrial countries to each other 
increase very rapidly. 
2. -The larger the time interval of setback process, the larger the opportunity for inter-
national trade becomes. 
3. -So far we haye supposed the elasticity of demand to be unity. This is justified so 
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far as the industrial goods are concerned. But in the period of recession when the demand 
for industrial goods decreases, Germany in our example must be forced to reduce her ex-
port price lower than in prosperity period. At the same time the large firm in Germany 
wants to strengthen the monopoly control over her home market. 
4. -In our simplified example we have supposed that the costs of both goods in the 
United States are constant. This may be an unrealistic assumption. But we wanted to 
make our arguments clear-cut and simple. \Ve believe that this assumption might not harm 
our arguments in this chapter. 
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3- INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL 
AND NON-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES. 
1) The Problem Stated 
The problem with which we want to deal in this chapter is an old and new one. This 
is an old problem in this sense that we find so many articles and books about this problem 
in the field of economic development. We might say this is a new problem, because a 
theoretically adequate solution of the problem has yet to come. 
As in the case of the previous chapter this problem is studies from purely theoretical 
points of view, and the readers are requested to follow the logic with patience. 
As Dr. M. K. Atallah points out, the poorer countries have decided to raise their standard 
of living, and are on the way of industrializing their countries. 
"Since the second World war, when most of the underdeveloped countries have discovered 
the differences between their economic conditions and the standard of living prevailing in 
the developed countries, and decided to decrease this gap by the development of their 
economies, a further aspect has been added to this problem: because all programs of eco-
nomic development require large amounts of capital goods attainnable in the advanced coun-
tries and must be exchanged as far as no capital imports take place for exports of primary 
products. The ability of the underdeveloped countries to acquire these goods depends, 
therefore, on the relation between the prices of their exports of primary products and the 
prices of their imports of capital goods" (M. K. Atallah, The Long-term Movement of the 
Terms of Trade between Agricultural and Industrial Products, 1958, P. 1) 
According to Dr. Atallah, the underdeveloped countries must acquire capital goods m 
exchange for their traditional primary products (so for as they get no capital imports). 
But this is not always a true picture. Some of the underdeveloped countries have built 
light industries such as textiles and are exporting the new products as in the case of India 
Pakistan, etc. 
Professor R. Nurkse told us that this type of industrialization would be favorable on the 
following reasons : 
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"Industrialization for export would seem an attractive solution in that it avoilds the need 
for carryng out any drastic and painful reform or "revolution" in domestic agriculture, 
under physical conditions that may be m any case unpropitions for agricultural improve-
ment" (R. Nurkse, op. cit., p. 309). 
As we have just seen in the previous chapter, the producers in home market can find 
its vent for surplus to foreign market. If the underdeveloped countries avoids carrying 
out any reforms in domestic agriculture, their home markets become narrower, because 
agricultural inhabitants occupy the large part of population and their annual income is so 
low. 
So m this case industrialization must of necessity seek export market, for home market 
IS narrow m the sense that agricultural sector can only absorb a portion of home-manufac-
tured goods. We want to emphasize the fact that industrialization for export market and 
domestic agriculture without any drastic land reform are coexistent in underdeveloped 
countries. 
In this chapter we want to examine what kind of international division of labour the 
underdeveloped countries starting light industries must confront. 
2) The New Type of International Division of Labour between Industrial 
and Non-industrial Countries. 
Let the typical industrial country be the United States of America, and the typical deYel-
oping country be Pakistan in our example. 
The unit of agricultural product is 90 in the United States and 60 in Pakistan. The unit 




















If trade takes place between the two countries, United States can obtain more than 0. 77 
units of agrioultural goods in exchange for 1 textiles. On the other hand Pakistan can 
get 1 unit of textiles in exchange for less than 1. 51 units of agricultural goods. This in-
ternational division of labour is an traditional type explained by the orthodox economists. 
Now let us advance our argument further. 
It is needless to say that economic development ensues the structural change in industry. 
Let us suppcse that the center of industrial activity has passed from light industries such as 
textiles to heavy industries such as machinery in the United States. The unit cost of 
machinery is 50 and that of textiles remains the same in the United States, where oligopoly 
has become the dominant pattern of industry. On the other hand the development of 
textile industry in Pakistan now collides against the narrowness of home market. 
Schema 1 can now be changed as follows : 
SCHEMA 2 
Machinery Textiles 
u.s. A. 50 70 
Pakistan 500 100 









cost Average I Total Total Average I variable I 
X k k/x cost I cost 
I 
I 
I I I 
I 








15 85 I 100 
I 
I I I I I 
The cost of textiles is represented by the monopoly firm in the United States, while 
competition is prevalent in the textile industry of Pakistan and its cost is an average of the 
firms. 
As we have studied in the previons chapter, the textile industry of Pakistan cannot com-
pete with that of the United States unless the former lowers the cost below the average 
variable cost of the United States, 50. The textile industry of Pakistan must cut its 
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average variable cost down to 34 (15 + 34 = 49). 
Usually the cost of living in developing countries is far below that in developed count-
ries. So the average variable cost can be lowered down to 34 so far as the textiles in 
Pakistan can be exported and consequently the employment in modern industrial sectors 
increases. 


















As a matter of fact the United States can export machinery m exchange of textiles. 
This exchange of goods is carried on by comparative costs, not by necessity with which 
developing countries are confronting. 
But this type of international division of labour does not mean the end of our argument. 
Professor Nurkse has brought a problem before us: 
"Just as textiles are usually the first manufactures to be started in the poorer countries, 
so also textiles are among the first to become sick industries in the more advanced coun· 
tries where workers as well as managers are quick to raise protest against "unfair" low· 
wage competition from backward areas. The pauper-labour argument, that great stand by 
of protectionists, is brought forward again. Charges of 'social dumping' are heard, even 
though the newcomers are only trying to make use of their one advantage : ample labor 
and cheap efficiency wages, an advantage which, as just observed, can be hard enough for 
them to make effective" (Ragnar Nurkse, Op. cit. p. 312). 
As Professor Nurkse points out rightly, the new export industries of developing countries 
often encounter the strong obstructions from the established industries in developed coun-
tries. So the developing countries cannot usually specialize their resources on their new 
226 
industries. Therefore in this case the doctrine of comparative costs only works in a limited 
extent. 
As Dr. Atallah observed, developing countries require large amounts of capital goods to 
industrialize their economies. If they cannot specialize their resources on their new export 
industries, other goods must be exported as complementary. 
Let us observe Schema 3. In this example Pakistan cannot export agricultural products 
unless she lowers the cost down to 49. 
products and textiles become 1 = 1. 
Then the relative cost between agricultural 


















In Schema 4 the United States can export machinery in exchange for both textiles and 
agricultural products. This example shows us that developing countries cannot export 
their goods unless they lowers their costs below the normal level. 
3) The Summary of this chapter. 
In many literatures which deal with economic development of non- industrial countries, 
authors discuss the terms of trade of developing countries without concrete results. 
Our example has brought a solution to this problem: it is completely impossible to solve 
the problem only with the terms of trade index, because, as \ve have just observed in our 
example, the developing countries must lower the costs before exporting. Otherwise deve-
loping countries could not export their goods. In developing countries lowered costs co-
rrespond with prices which can be measured statistically. So the terms of trade in deve-
loping countries are not sufficient to reflect the reduced costs of export industries. 
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Next we want to emphasize another important point. In our example Pakistan has be-
come an exporter of both the goods, agricultural products and textiles. This means that 
in developing countries new industries tend to be exported. We have explained this situa-
tion by the fact that home market in developing countries is narrow and there always ex-
ists the necessity to import capital goods. Here, as is shown in Schema 3 and 4, the doct-
rine of comparative doctrine must be modified in the light of our present experience in 
international trade. This is why we have called this pattern as the new type of interna-
tional division of labour between industrial and non-industrial countries. 
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4- CONCLUSION 
Starting from historical realities with -which we are confronted today, we have dealt with 
the two problems from the theoretical point of view: international division of labour bet-
ween industrial countries to each other under oligopoly, and that between industrial and 
non-industrial countries under the same condition. 
As we have observed in Preface of this essay, any theoretical treatment of international 
division of labour under the condition of oligopoly has not been successfully made. We 
have tried to solve the first problem with the aids of theoretical models from Professor 
Sylos-Labini ; international division of labour between industrial countries to each other 
under oligopoly. 
We have explained why trade between industrial countries to each other should increase 
so rapidly. The behavior of oligopolistic firms must of necessity seek the vent for surplus 
to foreign market. 
The second problem is related to international division of labour between industrial and 
non-industrial countries. We have pointed out that in developing countries the new indu-
stries such as textiles must find its export market just after startihg. The home market in 
developing countries is so narrow (of course we use the term "narrownese" in relative sense) 
that developing countries are forced to find their export markets. But they cannot succeed 
in exporting unless they cut the costs of their new industries to the level which may enable 
them to compete with the old established industries in developed countries. This logic ex-
plains the reason why in developing countries the wage level of modern industries should 
be lower. In connection with this problem we must mention that the goods of new indus-
tries in developing countries tend to be exported. We have called this phenomenon a new 
type pf international division of labour between industrial and non-industrial countries. We 
want to verify this problem statistically in future. 
229 
Atallah N. K. 
5- BIBLIOGRAPHY 
- The Long-term Movement of Trade between Agricultural and Indus-
trial Products, Rotterdam, 1958. 
Chamberlin E. N. - The Theory Moonop::>listic Co:nptition, Harvard Univ. Press. 1933. 
Haberler 





- The Theory of International Trade, English translation, London, 1956. 
- International Economics, Reprinted, Tokyo, 1959. 
- Economic Development, Principles, Problems, New York, 1959. 
- Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy, Harvard University, 
- The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London; 1933 
- An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
Cannans edition, 1961. 
Sylos-Labini, P, - Oligopoly and Technical Progress, English edition, Harvard University 
Press, 1962. 
Triffin, R. - Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, Harvard 
University Press, 1960. 
The Works and Correspondance of David Ricardo, ed. by P. Sraffa. 
230 
